NB: This list includes only publications which are related to the project goals. For a complete list of publications of the team members, see their personal homepages.
2019 and forthcoming
- van Dongen, Noah, Johnny van Doorn, … , Jan Sprenger and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers (2019). Multiple Perspectives on Inference for Two Simple Statistical Scenarios. The American Statistician, 73(sup1), 328–339.
- Cova, F., Strickland, B., Abatista, A., Allard, A., Andow, J., Attie, M., … & Cushman, F. (2019). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1–36. (From the MSIO project, Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger are involved.)
- Andreoletti, Mattia, and Rescigno, Maria (forthcoming). Microbiota-gut brain research: a plea for an interdisciplinary approach and standardization. Behavioral and brain sciences.
- Andreoletti, Mattia, and Maugeri, Paolo (forthcoming), Does medicine need philosophy?. Oral Diseases.
2018
- Colombo, Matteo, Georgi Duev, Michèle B. Nuijten and Jan Sprenger. Statistical Reporting Inconsistencies in Experimental Philosophy PLoS ONE 13(4): e0194360. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194360
- Romero, Felipe: Who Should Do Replication Labor? Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science 1: 516–537.
- Sprenger, Jan. Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength. The Philosophical Review 127: 371–398.
- Sprenger, Jan. Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69: 139–159.
- Sprenger, Jan. The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesian Inference. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8: 539–558.
2017
- Romero, Felipe: Novelty versus Replicability: Virtues and Vices in the Reward System of Science. Philosophy of Science 84: 1031–1043.
- Sprenger, Jan and Jacob Stegenga: Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures. Philosophy of Science 84: 840–852.
- Sprenger, Jan: Discussion: Beyond Subjective and Objective in Bayesian Statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 180: 1119. (Invited commentary on this paper by Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig in the same journal issue, pp. 1067–1130.)
- Colombo, Matteo, Leandra Bucher and Jan Sprenger. Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01430
- Colombo, Matteo, Leandra Bucher and Jan Sprenger. Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generalizability, and Causal Framing. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1806–1811. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
2016
- Romero, Felipe. “Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Social Epistemic Study“. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 60, 2016, pp. 55-69.
- Sprenger, Jan. The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument.European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6: 173–189. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6: 173–189.
- Sprenger, Jan. Bayésianisme versus fréquentisme en inférence statistique, in Isabelle Drouet (ed.): Le Bayésianisme aujourd’hui, 167–192. Paris: Editions matériologiques.
- Sprenger, Jan. Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference, in Alan Hájek and Chris Hitchcock (eds.): Handbook of the Philosophy of Probability, 382–405. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Colombo, Matteo, Postma-Nilsenova, Marie, and Jan Sprenger. Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Inference. In: Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., and Trueswell, J.C. (eds.). Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 432–437. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
