Publications

NB: This list includes only publications which are related to the project goals. For a complete list of publications of the team members, see their personal homepages.

Under review

• van Dongen, N., Wagenmakers, E. J., & Sprenger, J. (under review). A Bayesian perspective on severity: Risky predictions and specific hypotheses. Preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/4et65
• van Dongen, N., & van Grootel, L. (under review). Overview on the Null Hypothesis Significance Test. Preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/hwk4n

2022 and forthcoming

• Ongaro, M., & Andreoletti, M. (forthcoming). Non-empirical uncertainties in evidence-based decision making. Perspectives on Science [preprint available here: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19353/]

• van Dongen, N., & Borsboom, D. (in press). Comparing Theories with the Ising Model of Explanatory Coherence (IMEC). Psychological Methods. Preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/shaef
• Wagenmakers, E., Sarafoglou, A., Aarts, S., Dr., Albers, C. J., Algermissen, J., Bahník, Š., …, van Dongen, N., … Aczel, B. (in press). Seven Steps Toward More Transparency in Statistical Practice. Nature Human Behaviour. Preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/t93cg
• Aczel, B., Szaszi, B., Nilsonne, G., Van den Akker, O., Albers, C. J., van Assen, M. A. L. M., …, van Dongen, N., …  Wagenmakers, E. (in press). Consensus-based guidance for conducting and reporting multi-analyst studies. eLife. Preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/5ecnh
• M. Sikorski (forthcoming). “Minimal Theory of Causation and Causal Distinctions”, Axiomathes. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09548-5.

• Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). “Hempel and Confirmation Theory”. To appear in Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism. Ed. by Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Thomas Uebel. London: Routledge.
• Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). “The Paradoxes of Confirmation”. To appear in Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Ed. by Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. London: Routledge.
• Mattia Andreoletti and Jan Sprenger, eds. (2022) European Journal for the Philosophy of Science: Topical Collection “Philosophical Perspectives on the Replicability Crisis”.

2021

• Chiffi, D., & Andreoletti, M. (2021). What’s Going to Happen to Me? Prognosis in the Face of Uncertainty. Topoi, 40(2): 319-326. https://doi.org/10.1007/S11245-019-09684-Z
• F. Boem,  G. Ferretti and S. Zipoli Caiani (2021): Out of our skull, in our skin: the Microbiota-Gut-Brain axis and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Biology & Philosophy 36, 14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-021-09790-6
• Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger (2021). “Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way”. Synthese 198: 5803–5823. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02697-x
• van Dongen, N., & Sikorski, M. (2021). Objectivity for the research worker. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(3): 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00400-6
•  van Doorn, J., van den Bergh, D., Dablander, F., van Dongen, N., Derks, K., …  & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2021). Strong public claims may not reflect researchers’ private convictions. Significance, 18(1): 44-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/1740-9713.01493
• Cova, F., Strickland, B., Abatista, A., Allard, A., Andow, J., Attie, M., …, van Dongen., N., … & Zhou, X. (2021). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12(1): 9-44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0400-9
• Noah van Dongen, Matteo Colombo, Felipe Romero, and Jan Sprenger (2021). “Intuitions About the Reference of Proper Names: A Meta-Analysis”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12: 745–774. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00503-8
• Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, and Jan Sprenger (2021). “De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals. Part I: Trivalent Semantics and Validity”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 50: 187–213. OA link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-020-09549-6
• Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, and Jan Sprenger (2021). “De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals. Part II: Proof Theory and Algebraic Semantic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 50: 215–247. OA link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-020-09572-7
• Sprenger, Jan and Naftali Weinberger, “Simpson’s Paradox”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/paradox-simpson/>.

2020

• Andreoletti, M. (2020). Replicability Crisis and Scientific Reforms: Overlooked Issues and Unmet Challenges. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 33(3), 135-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292
• Federico Boem,  Stefano Bonzio, Barbara Osimani and Armando Sacco (2020):  “The Cochrane case: an epistemic analysis on decision-making and trust in science in the age of information”, Foundations of Science https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09668-y
• Amedeo Amedei, Federico Boem and Giulia Nannini (2020) : “Not just ‘immunity’: how the microbiota can reshape our approach to cancer immunotherapy”,  Immunotherapy, 12 (6): 407-416. https://doi.org/10.2217/imt-2019-0192
• F. Boem (2020): “Scientific Protocols as Recipes: A New Way to Look at Experimental Practice in the Life Sciences and the Hidden Philosophy Within”, HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13(38), 281-299. https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/326
• van Dongen, N. (2020). The scientific hypothesis is here to stay: Bradley E. Alger: Defense of the scientific hypothesis: from reproducibility crisis to big data. New York: Oxford University Press, xxvi+ 416 pp, $45 HB. Metascience, 29(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00556-6 
• van Dongen, N., Colombo, M., Romero, F., & Sprenger, J. (2020). Intuitions about the reference of proper names: A meta-analysis. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00503-8
• Jan Sprenger (2020). “Conditional Degree of Belief”. Philosophy of Science 87 (2): 319–335. https://doi.org/10.1086/707554

2019

• van Dongen, Noah, Johnny van Doorn, … , Jan Sprenger and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers (2019). Multiple Perspectives on Inference for Two Simple Statistical Scenarios.  The American Statistician, 73(sup1), 328–339.
• Cova, F., Strickland, B., Abatista, A., Allard, A., Andow, J., Attie, M., … & Cushman, F. (2019). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1–36. (From the MSIO project, Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero and Jan Sprenger are involved.)
• Andreoletti, M., & Maugeri, P. (2019). Does medicine need philosophy?. Oral diseases, 25(6), 1419-1422. https://doi.org/10.1111/odi.13143
• Andreoletti, M., & Rescigno, M. (2019). Microbiota-gut-brain research: A plea for an interdisciplinary approach and standardization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002868

• Felipe Romero (2019): “Philosophy of Science and The Replicability Crisis” [open access] Philosophy Compass 14 (11). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12633

2018

• Colombo, Matteo, Georgi Duev,  Michèle B. Nuijten and Jan Sprenger. Statistical Reporting Inconsistencies in Experimental Philosophy PLoS ONE 13(4): e0194360. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194360
• Romero, Felipe: Who Should Do Replication Labor? Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science 1: 516–537.
• Sprenger, Jan. Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength. The Philosophical Review 127: 371–398.
• Sprenger, Jan. Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69: 139–159.
• Sprenger, Jan. The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesian Inference. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8: 539–558.

2017

• Romero, Felipe: Novelty versus Replicability: Virtues and Vices in the Reward System of Science. Philosophy of Science 84: 1031–1043.
• Sprenger, Jan and Jacob Stegenga: Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures. Philosophy of Science 84: 840–852.
• Sprenger, Jan: Discussion: Beyond Subjective and Objective in Bayesian Statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 180: 1119. (Invited commentary on this paper by Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig in the same journal issue, pp. 1067–1130.)
• Colombo, Matteo, Leandra Bucher and Jan Sprenger. Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01430
• Colombo, Matteo, Leandra Bucher and Jan Sprenger. Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generalizability, and Causal Framing. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1806–1811. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

2016

• Romero, Felipe. “Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Social Epistemic Study“. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 60, 2016, pp. 55-69.
• Sprenger, Jan. The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument.European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6: 173–189. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6: 173–189.
• Sprenger, Jan. Bayésianisme versus fréquentisme en inférence statistique, in Isabelle Drouet (ed.): Le Bayésianisme aujourd’hui, 167–192. Paris: Editions matériologiques.
• Sprenger, Jan. Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference, in Alan Hájek and Chris Hitchcock (eds.): Handbook of the Philosophy of Probability, 382–405. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Colombo, Matteo, Postma-Nilsenova, Marie, and Jan Sprenger. Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Inference. In: Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., and Trueswell, J.C. (eds.). Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 432–437. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.